from the glacier

Modern science cannot escape the problem of causality in the creation of the universe. There are three possible solutions to the "origin" of the universe commonly proposed. First, the universe goes back to a certain point in time, and that is the beginning (the big bang et al.). Second, the universe had no beginning (either the infinite regress, or the cyclical universe). Thirdly, there is the "strange loop" where the latter determines the former, but the former causes the latter (a quantum cosmology). There are severe difficulties with all three.

Ad primum: Red shift is pretty well studied and documented. While there is disagreement as to what Hubble's constant should be, this school of thought usually says that about fifteen to twenty billion years ago BANG the universe started. What caused the bang? This would be outside of science. Some propose the theory of "bootstrapping" - that is, because of quantum fluctuations there is a probability of something springing out of nothing and starting the whole thing going. (aside - Poincare actually worked out the numbers. The odds, though, have way too many zeros for me to write out.) But even the bootstrapping argument has the difficulty as to why the universe came to be with the laws, regularities and so forth that it has. This cause also lies outside of the science.

Ad secundum: Human knowledge [of physics-] is thus unattainable if there is not any beginning. All further questioning of nature resolves into this infinite regress, and the understanding of the "initial conditions" is thrown out. Even if it were somehow proved that the universe extended infinitely in time backwards and had no beginning, there would still be the problem of why the laws and regularities are the way they are. These can be explained in a way by the first hypothesis, but that, as said, has its own problems.

Ad tertium: Again, the strange loop has the same problems as the infinite regress: why is the universe ordered how it is ordered? How does it come to be that there is suitable conditions for stars, planets, and, finally, life? These questions (of order, which science is based on) cannot be answered by the strange loop.

What are we to do? Invent a deus ex machina to save ourselves? Have the clockmaker god wind up the world? Perhaps we say "fuck it - life is absurd anyway". Maybe we move to Arkansas and say "physics don't exist - it ain't in Genesis". Maybe we follow some scientists into "superstring theory" and try to find a theory that mathematically unites all four forces, explaining them all simply and elegantly [while ignoring, in the pit of our stomachs, the unease at not being able to explain why that should be the way it is. . .]. Drink heavily?

Or perhaps

just perhaps

we rediscover metaphysics. . .

I parenthetically mentioned Godel's Theorem in my last post, expecting that to make clear how mathematical sciences being an invention of the mind would leave us knowing nothing. I now realize that is way too cursory an examination to make my point. But, since my explanatory power is inversely proportional to my interest in the subject, I will try to make this as easy to follow and interesting [ha] as possible. First, some background history . . .

Some of you my remember vaguely reading Dedekind. Roots of number theory and all of that, trying to separate arithmetic from Geometry. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries an attempt was proposed, that number theory could prove its own consistency. All that is saying that given a set of axioms, and simple "rules of inference" [symbolic logic] we could prove all theorems. Many attempts were made to have all of number theory derived from a very limited set of axioms.

On to the proof. Numbers and operations and so forth in this number theory [often called sentential calculus] are given letters and so forth with the standard symbolic logic "and" "or" "not" and so forth symbols. The "sentences" in sentential calculus represent "well-formed" strings. Analogically, the equation '8=' is not well-formed, because there isn't anything on the right of the equal sign. Godel showed that by giving words numbers and translating those numbers into "strings" that the strings were well-formed inside of the axiomatic schema. So, what does he do? He makes (roughly) the equivalent of "I cannot be proved in system A" (which we can call for simplicity, sentence G) a sentence written in system A. He then shows that it is "well-formed". Therefore, G is a theorem of the axiomatic schema, and a true theorem, as long as the schema is incomplete. But if we could prove G, then the axioms would contain a contradiction, because G itself says that it can't be proved. Thus he calls it "formally undecidable". But even if we added G as an axiom, to make a new, expanded schema, we could use the same method to create a new sentence "I cannot be proved in system A plus axiom G" and follow the same reasoning to get the same incompleteness.

To illustrate the point, Hofstadter, in "Godel, Escher, Bach" has a character with the best record player, who proclaims that it can play any record. So the other character make a record called "I cannot be played on so-and-so's record player". This record, when played, makes sounds that resonate in the natural frequency of the record player, causing it to vibrate and break. This is the result of axiomatic number theory - a broken record....

Back to last post. If mathematics is purely an invention, deductions following from inferences and axioms, then it is incomplete or inconsistent, for it follows Godel's proof. If that is the case then the human endeavor in mathematical physics is a waste of time. This is why I rejected choice number two.

I guess this point was already made in a way in this blog. I just have a different way of going about it, I suppose. My division would rather be one of "mathematizing" the cosmos.

There seem to be two divisions. First, either the universe, and the knowledge thereof, is understood mathematically or it isn't. Second, either mathematics is "out there" to be discovered by man, or it is invented by man - purely as a construct of logic. This would give us four logical possibilities:

1: The universe is understood mathematically, and that is discovered.

2: The universe is understood mathematically, and this is invented.

3: The universe is understood a-mathematically, but mathematics is discovered.

4: The universe is understood a-mathematically, and that is invented.

Think about it: Biology really isn't a science, because it has no laws that are formulated as mathematical algorithms. All laws of physics are just words used to describe a mathematical formula. Newton's Second Law: F=ma. But back to the choices. Choice four is sort of the fundie way of looking at the universe, disturbing to say the least. [the universe is understood only Biblically, and math is invented]. Choice three makes no sense to me. If mathematics is really out there, and is discovered, how could that not tell us something of the universe? Choice two has problems of its own, for if we look at the crushing defeat of axiomatic number theory, following Hilbert's Program, we see that we could not understand the universe at all. If math is solely invented, and not discovered, it will always be subject to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

This leaves us with choice number one. [I guess this would make me a quasi-Platonist....]

I was thinking. . .

Things are knowable insofar as they have actuality. All things have actuality, and are therefore intrinsically knowable in themselves. But to be knowable in itself is not necessarily to be known by this or that particular knower. Again, there is also knowledge of the thing, and one's knowledge of one's knowledge of the thing. [knowing vs. self-consciousness]

Turn to science - generically. We make statements about nature. This is knowledge. We make statements about our knowledge of nature - and this is epistemology. We make statements about our science (philosophically) and this is meta-science.

The confusion in modern science (specifically) is a level confusion between science, epistemology and meta-science. As shulamite pointed out, the only reason people read Dawkins et al. is because of the philosophy. Thus these books should not be called biology, but meta-biology. Examine quantum indeterminacy. Is that indeterminate because of the thing itself, or because of our knowledge of the thing (or perhaps both). To say that quanta have wave-like and particle-like properties is perhaps a difficulty in language - our epistemological understanding of electro-magnetism in modernity. Perhaps the thing itself in question has an actuality we have not fully described, and is therefore more knowable to us? Perhaps it lacks the actuality of other objects in nature, and is hence more potency (or less actualization of said potency) and thus our cursory knowledge is complete? Perhaps, epistemologically, the mathematical description of nature is not the complete language needed to describe the world? Perhaps, finally, we need to slow down and remember our A,B,Ds.

My lovely e. is in Washington D.C. visiting friends, so here I am, at home in the "great" midwest, with John, Andy and Sara: ages 1 to 4, for the weekend. Oh, and if that were not enough to scare most men, my ears are still fucking ringing from the punk show we went to last night, (and yes, BR still shreds in their old age) in the last forty-eight hours I have eaten precisely and only three pastor tacos, and drank ten beers as my only sustenance. (Plus the five gallons of coffee I drink a day, and the Camels) I got kicked in the head by a fucking crowd surfer with a mohawk, while listening to Murphy's Law cover "Someone Got Their Head Kicked In" by Black Flag. I love irony. Pennywise sang "Fuck Authority" and "Bro Hymn" which strangely reminds me of one Daniel Fluery. At work today I answered phones and talked to morons all with the ever present ringing of Tinitis in my ears.

I raised my middle finger in angst with the kids. I shouted lyrics to Bad Religion songs I have loved since my misspent youth. I fucking threw elbows at the ever-expanding mosh circle. I bought over-priced beer in handfuls, using the pockets of my ancient "seminar shirt" [blue with pinstripes and a red skull patch over the left chest - come on, you've seen it] to hold spare cans of full beer. My steel toed Docks kicked shins. My glasses we "re-adjusted" by elbows - of other people. Sick of it All covered "Minor Threat" and we all loved every minute of it. (well, it is only one minute long, anyway - fuck it, it is only punk rock)

Which brings me to my point. FUCK IT, IT IS ONLY PUNK ROCK. (aside - I miss the mohawk I used to have. . .) That was the most authentic Dasein I have seen in years. Sadly.

Although the first postulate was postulated, I think it somehow is not a postulate, but rather a corollary of Beitia's First Law of Physics. You see, every science thinks they need to start from principles. But the problem in the modern academy is the inability to have structure or hierarchy. We have departments, disciplines, concentrations and so forth. This is all well and good, but the problem arises when we have no discernible structure in knowledge. Most sciences draw upon lower sciences for the basis of their arguments, and report to higher sciences. I guess the problem I see is made clear in de Anima. Group Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Sociology. Their certitude goes from most to least in the order I gave them. In that way, one could reasonably say that Mathematics is the better science than Sociology. But Sociology deals with a higher object intrinsically, therefore it must be accounted better. All this babbling aside, I think it is necessary to see Theology as the queen of the sciences, philosophy as her handmaid, and all other things subject to that. Of course, that is not to say that these things are not worthwhile studying in their own right (math and so forth) but that they are lower sciences. Physicists would not have it this way. Paul Davies goes so far as to say that Physics is the queen of sciences.

I guess that is why Postulate one will further more be named Corollary One of Beitia's First Law. I'm too lazy to go back edit all my posts, so there it is. If all learning leads us to truth, and truth is one, then all disciplines are subject to that truth. The sarcasm and self-reference of the first law indicated (humorously, I had hoped) the necessity of stepping outside of the current science to appeal to another science - a higher one.

I fear all my verbiage will make it impossible to follow the thread... Alas. I may have to recapitulate one of these days. . .

The relationship between mass and energy given by Einstein has a peculiar effect in quantum physics. Taking two very small particles, accelerating them nearly to the speed of light, and running them into one another oftentimes produces new particles - with more mass than the original. The kinetic energy of the collision results in the creation of new mass. Sometimes, however, one of the particles "ceases to be" creating a release of energy - in proportion to the mass (according to the equation). So I got to thinking: what is the definition of energy?

So I grabbed a science textbook from the bookshelf:

If this isn't the most post hoc definition I have read, I'm not sure what is. But then I started thinking like (in the manner of) Aristotle in reference to the pre-Socratics. When talking about Thales, Aristotle uses "all is water" to show the glimmer of truth - that matter must be able to become things, and the mutability of water makes it an attractive choice. So how do we look at the bad definition and pull some gem of wisdom out of it? Then it became very clear. Ability. Potency. To do. Resolved to act. Energy, in this translation, becomes "the potentiality resolving to act in work." Cumbersome, to say the least. Again, looking at the first paragraph here, energy can also become matter. So it doesn't just do work. So we can re-write our new definition as: "the potentiality resolving to act in work or becoming matter". But then again, what is work?

Okay, here's the vicious circle rearing its ugly head. Perhaps no headway can be made. But if we forget the textbook definition for a moment, and think about the mathematical representation, or equations for work: Work = Force multiplied times distance. Interesting, so work is a moving thing. Example, if I wanted to pick up a keg of beer, and run up a flight of stairs, the work done would be the weight of the keg (the force of "gravity") multiplied by the height of the second floor (the distance up I carried the keg). So it looks now that work is a moving of material things. How does that fit into our newer definition of energy?

Energy is the potentiality resolving to act in moving matter or becoming matter. So then energy is a principle of change (in the Aristotelian sense). My only question then is whether energy is the potentiality or the resolving to act. If we then take up the first option, energy becomes a sort of "universal potentiality" - that which can become all things. But I don't think that this is exactly correct. In the second case, energy becomes synonymous with Aristotelian motion. But I also think that this is incorrect. Maybe we should re-write our definition again. Boldface words are used in the sense of the Physics of Aristotle, brackets to conjoin an idea. Energy is the [potentiality resolving to act] in change. Using change to replace local motion and substantial change simplifies our definition. I think that if we consider "potency resolved to act" as one thing it also clears up things. But again, potentiality resolving to act means motion in the Aristotelian sense (with attendant qualifications, of course). So does that mean that we have come upon it? Energy is the motion in change. Energy is the changing in change. Energy is the whereby change can occur. Energy is prime matter . . .

Sadly, it is all about comparative philosophy/physics. But, back to my last post, (specifically, postulate #1) Aristotle uses matter and form as a means of explaining motion. Here again, by motion we mean change (although it seems that the moderns have reduced all change to local motions, for better or for worse. . .). Let's think about it though, what does matter and form conjoined in substance teach us about change? Clearly there must be some potentiality in the thing itself in order that it be other than it is (locally, with relation to quality [hot/cold] and so forth). Even if we understand accidental forms in another way, still the reasoning looks good. For example, take the accidental form of "hot" in a lump of metal. That accidental form could be explained as increased molecular motion [local] and the corresponding collisions because of this motion. But is that to say that this motion is not something superadded to the "metalness" of the thing? Again, if mathematics is a study of form, then even the mathematical description of the heat will be formal, if accidental to the substance. Even if we say that all of the molecules, atoms, and particles of a particular lump of metal are always moving, the particular "hotness" or relative rapidity of motion is still an additional formality, or determination of the thing. Just because all inside the thing is moving, it is not to say that it has to move in any particular way.

Now we step back. E=mc^2. C is the speed of light in a vacuum. M is mass, E is energy. Now I know that modern textbook high school science gives workable definitions to these two, m and e. But I ask, perhaps following the shulamite, what is the definition of energy?

And if we had a definition of energy, would it be possible to say that Einstein's equation somehow brings something to bear on potentiality in substance? On matter (in the Aristotelian sense)? On substantial form understood mathematically?

All the outpouring of rage and angst I have been subjected to at various points in my life concerning atomic theory, etc. etc., has been based on a grave misunderstanding both of nature and of physics. All of the objections that people have raised in the past are against some sort of Anaximanderian 'void-motion-hard-indivisible-stuff' theory of the universe. So, to prevent (...) any more confusion on the subject, let me lay down some postulates:

I may think of more as they come to me. But, for now, I think that it is enough to keep these four in mind at all times when thinking about modern science and philosophy/theology. Hateful as it may seem, this is still part of the tradition. It remains to see how these four "postulates" combine to for a cohesive argument. Back to the original point, however, all these have to kept in mind when discussing atomism. This is not the atomism of Newton's Principia, or of Lucretius' De Rerum Natura.

But I've dropped enough names for one night....