from the glacier

Or better yet, "So what?"

elaborate?

Well, I suppose your "why" precedes the "so what" question. But, what is the purpose of believe if you cannot act in the world. In other words, truth should neccesitate action.

Also, to answer your "why" I will stick with Pascal, "The heart has it reasons which the mind cannot grasp." (I am not sure if it is verbatim but the spirit of his thought is certainly there)

Maybe we need to disntiguish between trues. I know that the sum of the angles inside a triangle are (under the Euclidean hypothesis) equal to to right angles. Does this force me to measure triangles? Construct them? In any way do anything?
I guess by truth you mean theological or, less forceful, philosophical truth. To your second point, maybe religious sentiment is a result of diet and not the heart. We could re-phrase the quote to say "the belly has gurglings for which the mind has no reasons." Would this change the spirit of the thought?

Why do I love? I just do. We do not chose our loves. 'Why?' may not always be the most helpful of questions, philosophically or otherwise.

[I had Harry Frankfurt's "The Reason's of Love" in mind when I wrote this.]

drm - uh, what? How can you love without choosing and what the hell does this have to do with anything? Without why there is no because - because teaches. Another way of saying it could be - I'm not quite sure what you are alluding to.

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I suppose it would change the force of the thought. While the heart is informed by the mind, it seems to me that what changes the heart is not simply the force of some particular deduction, etc. Instead it is a matter of cumlative experience. This accumlation can be articulated but not fully. Asking why I trust God is like asking why I trust my friend. You can give reasons but they do not lend the weight needed to give the argument its full force.

Also, while I grant your distintion between truths, Euclid does not neccesitate that I go measuring triangles, it seem to me it should inform us about how to build bridges. Truth is not truth unless, finally, it is applicable to something. This, of course, does not mean that truth's principle is application but rather a neccesary consequence.

Am I speaking to your question?

But again, cumulative experience could just be dietary. Maybe if you ate more leafy greens you would be a Buddhist. Also, I am not supporting some hyper-rationalistic doctrine where the mind rules all. I just get curious about the psychological aspects of religiosity. If cumulative experience is primary, then . . . then something. Oh, then virtue would be based on proper upbringing and right experiences. This strikes me as odd. Thirdly, I don't see how truth is particularly a principle of action, unless the truth that is in dispute is a practical (moral?) truth. But if you are saying that is the essence of theology, then my first objections apply.
Commandment: love God. How this is to be done, of course, is subject to interpretation. I'm just not sure about yours...

Or again, "faith without works is dead" . . . if your position resolves to this instead of "faith alone" you sound very un-protty . . . [sorry, a joke at your expense]

Joke away, my good man. Although, I think if we had a longish conversation about faith and works these days you may be surprised at what I think. Perhaps a post is in order.

Also, regarding my interpretation about loving God. These days, I am not sure either. Recently (over the course of this year), I have realized I have been looking at God wrongly. God is more than a "self thinking thought," he is more than a thing but an immanent God who has inserted Himself in history (I knew this, of course, but in another way I had not). Frankly, these days, I am not sure what to do with such a God.

Yeah, but what about the rest of my "response". . . curious to hear. . .

Eat more leafy greens.... practice your "ooohhhm"

...that was a lot of "these days."

I need to think about about the rest of the response...perhaps over a cig.

Yes, but a diet of cigarettes and coffee make you an existentialist. Psychology reduces to physiology reduces to diet and exercise.

ONE MUST IMAGINE SISYPHUS HAPPY. *ahem* sorry...too much coffee today.

"If cumulative experience is primary, then . . . then something. Oh, then virtue would be based on proper upbringing and right experiences. This strikes me as odd."

There are two things that may be said about that:

1. Unless, your experience's cause you to doubt yourself and see that all your inclinations and desires are distorted. Then, virtue could be construed as the opposite of what you suggested Although, your suggestion may also stand so it would depend on perspective.

2. The pyschological must not be taken as primary. Secondly, I think I am being imprecise with my langauge. What I mean by experience includes the abstract, the cognitive, but is wider. In fact, one may count history as a derived experience of sorts. In other words, I understand freedom through my American framework as opposed to a Chinese. One can see how different they are. This comes, not only, from my personal experience but the shape of the culture which shapes the world in which I experience and think about things. It would be nice, if we could fit everything theological into our "American framework" (and some have tried) but challenge comes in seperating the distorted view of Scripture from the undistorted view.

The problem here is obvious. How do we know what the undistorted view is? This is where the heart comes in and what I would call attitudinal rather than physchological for conotational reasons. While we should not reject reason as a mode of knowing, and the primary way that the heart is "informed." We must understand that the grounding for all knowledge does not fundamentally lie in the mind. Otherwise, where is real meaning and truth? Here is the crux: There must be a Norming Norm and standard for which to judge things. This means a positional (directional?) move, namely a humilty in the face of Scripture, i.e. Divine Revelation. This is to say that we ought not to judge it with exteral criteria (think Grecian thought, metaphysics, etc.) but rather submit to its articulations (by this I mean in tone not in verba but that is another discussion).

Naturally, this does not mean that, "we will see Scripture clearly and all will agree on interpretation," that is niave. But we can say that it may be a more honest way to approch truth, at least of a theological nature because it acknowledges the creator/creature distinction by assenting to Who has the Truth and who needs it. We can't begin to even look for "the undistorted view" (a fiction in this life, incidentally) but it certainly moves us closer. "We see things dimly, as in a mirror, etc."

Does this make sense? Am I speaking to your response?

Speaking to your third point concerning truth not being a principle of action. Even, if you are right, I point you to Keirkegaard, "I certainly do not deny that I still recognize an imperative of understanding and that through it one can work upon men, but it must be taken up into my life, and that is what I now recognize as the most important thing."

Here we go again . . .
Point 1: I deny that inclinations and desires are ever distorted. In and of themselves the are what they are; that is, no one is confused as to whether they desire food, for example, but whether the eating of that food will make them happy, unhappy, blessed, cursed, and so forth. So maybe you mean something else than distorted, or something else than desire and inclinations.
Point 2: How can we not take the psychological as primary? Yes I see your shared history in culture as formative in experience, which is additional to one's own personal experience etc. But the problem I have with your solution is that you propose humility. Whose humility? Yours? Mine? I don't see how one's own private humility (stress the private) is any less psychological than any other inclination. Further, one could make the claim that humility is the effect of various causes (I say mostly dietary - fasting makes humble, gorging makes proud). So are you talking about humility, or the "feeling of humility in myself", and, if the former, how would we even know it isn't the latter?

To your third point, let me quote St. Thomas: "Appeal to authority is the weakest form of argument, according to Boethius". Irony on many levels.

To point one: pedophilia stems from a distorted sexual desire. An obese person's desire for food is distorted.

To point two:

1.humility = a recognition of one's creatureliness/finitude. The consequence: recognizing one's perspective is not THE perspective. This begs for a norming norm.

2. humility by its nature is not private because it involves the interaction with another person(s) be it in person or through the communicative act called writing. In short humilty implies relation.

3. Perspective's are NOT bad, they merely shape your perception and humility helps one be aware of this and work with perspection.

The consequence: "objective/bird's eye view/unbounded, unbiased perspective is a fiction.

Point 3: liberal education in all its manifestation is for the sake of "being free" through knowledge to choose the good. This means living well, virtuously. Hence, all truth in some way (I will grant in different ways) is aim towards action. Virtue may be a habit, but habits direct actions and relationships which are types of actions. I do not know what it means to be virtuous yet, or to use biblical language, holy so I again defer to the K. quote.

That is my quick response, now on to my Gospel's homework.

And again . . .
To point one:
Pedophilia does not stem from a distorted desire, but an incorrect object of a natural desire.
Point two:
Humility in only relational accidentally. If it implies finitute, it implies MY finitude. It is only relational because the personal is communicable. (I love ending several words in the same sentence with the same consonant sound) As to point two subpoint three, true. But this leads into:
Point three:
If there is no objective "outside" unbiased perspective then we are, to quote Camus (too much coffee today) "we are all alone". If this is true, then there is no "truth" but truth to me. If that is the case then I still don't see it as a prinicple of action, unless by action you mean any activity of man, such as quiet reflection, which would be an action because we are reflect-ing. But this is an equivocal use of action. SO what do you mean by action??

Point one: I affirm your distinction (I should know better than to claim what I did) but I do not think the affirmation does violence to the view as whole.

Point two: How else could one define humilty but as relational? Relation can be an essential characteristic, if one takes the personal, rather then quiddity as a grounding. I am wondering how you would define it?

Point three:
This is only the case if we take the Cartesian framework of "doubting everything as uncertain" as our starting point. I am unsure of this, lately I have been thinking that humilty as a grounding recognizes that we are limited in understand (all things are not absolutely certain) but still have some real knowledge of things, God, et cetera, but not exhaustive knowledge.

I don't think I fully answered the points but I think this gives a good basis for further discussion. Also, to be clear (for once?), I am not trying to prove an a firm epistemic grounding but rather articulate one. I think everybody here thinks we know something. Further, I do not think we could prove it if we wanted to.

Okay, without laying the groundwork for an epistemology, I would like to articulate my own here (not-so-rigorously), based on the three points of contention.
Point one: Desires in themselves are natural and morally neutral.
Point two: No virtue, vice, or, in general, disposition of the soul is relational. All are personal, private and unrelated in their essence to any other person. Only accidentally are they related because they are communicable. But they are not communicable in essence, but only analogously, since all are personal and private. Thus my fear, and your fear are only named the same, but are not the same except analogously for you could never experience mine nor I yours. The same goes for humility. It is recognition of MY finitude, not reconginition of my finitude vs. another's infinitude, or even another's finitude analogous to mine. It simply is.
Point three: Since all dispositions of the soul are private and individual, there is nothing in truth that is a principle of action, except accidentally. Action is going to - or fleeing from - or reacting to - but all of these are relational. All dispositional attitudes are not relational. Therefore, the principle of action is probably a disposition of the sould uniquely determined as well.

Yes, and it is certainly coherent but the "habits of virtue" seem most true in actions. One is not merely couragous but one is couragous in the face of the enemy, one must be humble in the face of someone. It is at these moments that one could name a particular person, most aptly, as humble, couragous, etc.

It seems to me that while their are some merits to your view but while it mantians the integraty of virtue as something consistent it does violence to virtue as an action.

The hidden premise is this, we must define virtue in an ontological framework rather than a personal one. To define it ontologically is Grecian in roots (a discription, not a critique) and why must start with ontology?

One of my virtues is not spelling.

But again, even if one is courageous in the face of the enemy, it is not the enemy that makes courage. People faced with the same enemy react in different ways, thus one is courageous, the other a coward. Two people react the same way in the same circumstance, yet one is considered prideful or rash (see Diomedes in the Iliad) while the other is deemed courageous. What is the commonality? It is the disposition of soul in the person that determines this.
Perhaps the view does violence to virtue as an action. Perhaps that is precisely the point.
And again, I do not see the necessity of determining an ontological framework for virtue when I am not convinced that there is an ontology of virtue to be had. Let me be more clear:
1 IF virtue is a disposition of soul, then virtue is personal.
2 IF the personal is uniquely determined, then one personal can be related to another only analogically.
3 Therefore, IF 1 and 2, then there can be no relation of virtue, and the personal, to the absolute, thus no ontological framework.
[oh no . . . I just spun myself a crack spider web]

Damn it all, you are making me look at the Aristotle's Ethics again and this reminds me of Pieta. I have an aversion to remembering that man.

So are you going to argue from the fittingness of the man in relation to the Polis? I believe there is still the matter of my "ifs" to be determined. Or you could take another road, and say that this is simply not what you believe. But then you would be agreeing, by losing the ontological framework, and stating your belief in the opposite.
SO, either there is a problem in the ifs, or I am correct - even if you disagree, because if you disagree, but find no fault with the ifs, then your disagreement agrees. [maybe an LSD spiderweb]

My Professor today brought up a Thomistic distinction I had not thought about in awhile.

Ontological = pertaining to substance

Ontic = qualities, that is, things which are real but have no substance like love.

I suppose part of my confusion lies in not understanding this distinction.

Here is the point, I am willing to agree with you as long as I can make the qualification that virtues, although habits of the soul, have no real meaning outside of their context. This is to say while a person may posses courage, it is a person is only really couragous in the face of an enemy. One could understand this through act and potency while I don't think that particular framework is necessary, it is not unhelpful.

The still does not answer the question of the "Norming Norm." For courage could be defined as rashness depending on principles.

How to philosophize with a hammer?
I'll go you one further: virtues have no meaning whatsoever. For them to have meaning, they must be able to be related to one another, to a universal, or some ontological principle. Due to the ifs, they are not. Therefore they have no meaning. Isolated anomolies, which all acts would therefore become, have no intrinsic meaning. Also, a corollary would be the absence of a "norming norm"; so that you could call it courage, you could call it rashness, neither really matters. Each act and each separate disposition of soul would be unique, subsuming them under one title, one term, would be analogical at best, patently false at worst.
Confuse away, my good man, it only gets deeper.

"Confuse away, my good man"

It's what I do best. Besides, I need to flex these muscle to really hammer out my view. This is enjoyable. I will respond to this but I need to write a few papers so I have to stay focused (you can see that I am already having a problem with this).

I will say this, I suppose there needs to be an ontological root, but that must be understood in its proper context in the world. The last thing I want to do is talk about "Being in general."

Well, to tease, if there is to be an ontological root, you need to destruct one or both of the first two ifs - in a manner that does not fall into the ifs themselves. But, as you are a busy man with many papers to write [ahem *cough cough* - lame excuse] I can wait for a response before I hammer out another redux.

Or perhaps I need to be more clear. The ifs hold the key: if there was some ontological principle, it would have to avoid a critique from the ifs. But if there isn't any way to do so, then we sink into a morass of relativism, and "we are all alone". My diet won't allow for this [or maybe it will, I haven't eaten meat since Lent began. . .]

Perhaps you are right, I will have to go back and look at the arugment.

The more I think about it there must be an ontological root; however, I am not sure that the ontology gives a particular quality its meaning. In other words, meaning is not a mode of being. It is a grounding for being, for something has to be before it has meaning but to say that virtue is a habit which resides in the soul doesn't give flesh to what virtue is. We must contextualize it to understand what virtue is and how it works. This is how we know anything, even algebra.

(back to the lame excuse)

I'm not sure what "contextualize" and "giving a quality meaning" mean. And also, if the ifs are such, then what virtue is is decidedly different from how it works. Finally, in dispositions of the soul, I'm not sure that what it is and its meaning are separable in fact, even if they are in thought. In fact, I think separating certain things in thought that are inseparable in point of fact can be misleading. . .