Prelude... again
No one denies that thoughts, ideas, are in some way "inside" of man. In fact, we here fully affirm that they are totally inside the man, in every essential respect. When Platonists prescribe the forms "ideas" existing apart in their own separate, higher reality, we see the burden of proof on them. Semi-syllogistically, this would run in the following manner. Thoughts are in man. Man knows his thoughts. To say that his thoughts come from higher requires an addition positing of some third thing, in addition to the two: man and the thought. Occam's razor neatly slices away the other. . .
Why is it necessary that the world be intelligible at all? Intelligibility requires that there be some sense in which the world is in the mind. In fact, it requires either a god to know the world, and our participation in that - the semi-Platonic view, or that the world is in some sense a representation of that inside of man - an un-rigorous Sartrean view. Or perhaps some third intermediary view - like that of Aristotle. There is some "faculty" in us that apprehends the "intelligible form" directly. So that man in his whatness sees the natural stuffocity of the thinghood in question. Jargon? Perhaps. A description of the world? Less likely.
Shouldn't we rather assert that the universe is unintelligible? But there is some "faculty" in man - call it the untruthful faculty - that smears nature into these categories of thought for the sake of recognizing dissimilar situations as the same - for the sake of living. But then wouldn't all recognition of similitude be an analogous smearing of nature? We see the fundamental questionableness of nature. But nature is dumb. She never answers our calls...
You point to a fundamental difference in principle found among philosophers. Is the world intelligible, or do we impose intelligibility upon it? In the second view, the world is unknowable. In the first view, the ideas man has are read out of nature, not into it. Both views are definitely logically possible. (This is why I love Kant so much, even though I don't accept his philosophy.) There can be no proof for the one position or for the other, yet one or the other must be accepted on faith, or rather accepted in love. This act of faith is the foundation of all knowledge, not as apodictic certainty, (which is unattainable,) but as a direct seeing of the truth.
You make your choice, I'll make mine.
Argued by
N |
9:44 PM
And thus enters rational dogmatics. The product of apodictic certainty. The critique folds in on itself.
Argued by
Andrew Simone |
9:56 AM
Oh, Neo, so your edifice of philosophy is rooted in irrational belief that you can know something? Shakey footing for so grand a tower.
Additionally, you position folds on itself - I believe the world is knowable - is a self-defeating proposition.
Argued by
beitiathustra |
8:21 PM
Only if one perpetuates the long standing folly of philosphy, that knowledge implies certitude. Certitude is simply speaking not part of the definition of knowledge. The belief that it is has debauched philosophy for millenia.
Nor is the belief required for knowledge an irrational one. Is it irrational to believe that I exist? Or to believe that I know I exist? Yet not even my existence can be known with apodictic certainty. The 'cogito' must be reduced to the 'cogitatio'.
Argued by
N |
8:45 PM
So, Neo, two things:
First, in "logic" the conclusion can have no more force than the premises. If a premiss is hypothetical, then the conclusion can be no more than hypothetical. But your "theory of knowledge" is based on belief. Therefore, your knowledge can be no more than belief.
Secondly, I have not said that knowledge = certitude. This is something you have read into what I have said. But since you say, specifically, that knowledge is not certitude, then I would be curious to hear what your definition of knowledge is. So, have at:
Argued by
beitiathustra |
12:25 PM
I have supposed that you mean that knowledge=certitude, but that knowledge implies certitude, has it in its definition or essentially requires it.
Knowledge is intuition, sensible or intellectual. I can truly see a table, but yet not have apodictic certitude that it is there or that I am seeing it. Nevertheless I do in fact see it, and thus know it. Just so I can intellect the essence of man, and yet not have apodictic certitude that I do in fact know what man is. Nevertheless, I do intuit his essence, and do know it.
Argued by
N |
5:51 PM
I meant to say that I have NOT supposed that you mean etc. ...
Argued by
N |
5:52 PM
Still not sure what you mean by know. Still seems you equivocate "know" with "see" and "intuit".
If all you are saying is that "I can't tell you what x is, but I know x when I see it", then I think this is a very poor form of "knowledge".
Knowledge, if I may be so bold as to venture a positive statement, prelude unfinished, is communicable. Men communicate with language. Therefore, knowledge is in some sense with language. Your "knowing" is not with language, thus not communicable. Therefore, not a knowing at all.
Be more strict with your definition of knowledge, I may have inklings of commonality...
Argued by
beitiathustra |
8:17 PM
"A description of the world? Less likely."
Why?
Argued by
Anonymous |
5:43 AM
drm - the sentences you quoted refer to the sentence preceeding them starting with "so man in his..." that is why it is not a likely description of the world: philosophical jargon is from man, not from nature.
Argued by
beitiathustra |
8:16 AM
Consequently, it becomes a question of frameworks: What color lens do you look through? (mine is green).
Argued by
Andrew Simone |
11:26 AM
I don't think it is a question of framework, but as I haven't finished the prelude, I'm not at liberty to say what "it's about". In fact, I think that framing it as a question of framework is identically self-defeating (see prelude part II) for I would rather not just study what studying studies, studiously.
As an aside, my lens turns everything a monochrome grey.
Argued by
beitiathustra |
8:25 PM
Point taken. Although, I think it depends on the concern, it is important to know where you ideas came from and why you think the way you do (framework) in order to be sure you are not assuming an untruth unwittingly.
Argued by
Andrew Simone |
3:18 PM
I will be interested in seeing more.
Argued by
Andrew Simone |
3:18 PM
Well, at the risk of sounding lame, there is an overall plan and order to what I've been slowly plunking away on the keyboard. But I've been very busy and the next piece of the puzzle won't be birthed for a little while. Keep objecting/commenting because so far your and Neo's objections fall in perfect alignment with what I'm leading up to.
Argued by
beitiathustra |
8:17 AM