Veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad. . .
Sometimes things which are manifold are oversimplified by vices of language. "Truth is the adequation of the intellect to the thing." No one may deny that there is some sense in which something can be said to be "in" the mind. But this in seems so slippery. I'm sure the shulamite could correct me on this, but it seems that definitions do not admit of demonstration, so long as the thing defined is simple and not manifold. We can name the manifold in actuality by one term, but that does not mean the term so named is simple, or that the definition of this is not the conclusion of some demonstration. What are we adequating? Why are we adequating? How is adequation possible? Why is it even necessary to think that it is possible? Which rem? Whose intellectus? Truth: definitive, propositional, factual, tautological, analogical?
