Prelude, part IV
Isn't the term "nature" the largest stereotype of man's thought? In a sociological sense, men cannot be categorized by external appearances, for every man is different. Poor social justice and odd political philosophies have been based on this taking of the unessential for true, and necessary. What is the case with nature? "All or for the most part" we have been taught. Is this nothing more than taking that which is unessential - similarity - for necessary? Each thing, each instantiation of sensuous material 'stuff', each incident, each happenstance is different. Categorically, and by this we mean in the mind, we call these differences accidents. But existence in the mind is wildly difference from existence. Shouldn't we perhaps consider these things as essentially different - in themselves? (assuming of course the phrase 'in itself' is not just another stereotype) With this, there is the abolition of nature, the rejection of the "oughts" placed on the outside world, based on the untruthful 'faculty' of man, indiscriminately smearing the dissimilar together. For this is what we mean when we say something "has a nature" - it acts in a way similar to another different thing. So instead of naming everything individually (each blade of grass with its own proper name - etc.) we squish it all into the conceptual category - nature. Nature is in man, not in things.
Your argument from analogy fails because men are free agents. You cannot stereotype man because he is a person. You don't think things in nature have free wills?
Argued by
N |
5:38 PM
It is good to note, that Aristolean distinctions (to name one view of nature) are some notional distinctions. Fine. The question one must ask do these categories have any relation to thing outside of us. (You, of course, ask this question.) Perhaps we should construe them as esstentially different, but must we pusht he logic that far? I am willing to grant that what "we say about nature" and "the way nature is" is not a 1 to 1 corespondance. That is why I have recently been thinking it is a question of adequately describing what I observe. It is a matter of approach, I think. What would you say to this:
What can still define things but, in the act of defining we are describing rather than prescriping. Intentionality comes to the forefront.
Secondly, if we are to take Scripture articulation of creation seriously, then how does these Preludes fit in with that. If you were to say, "I am starting with reason stripped from theological concerns." If this is the case, is that possible and, further, even if it is possible is it correct to do so and why?
Argued by
Andrew Simone |
1:29 PM
By the creation account, I am thinking particularly of when Adam named the animals. This should not be understood as "defining their nature" but he is certainly asserting verbal hegemony over nature.
Note, I am not claiming that man's nature is to assert verbal hegemony.
Argued by
Andrew Simone |
1:39 PM